BACKGROUND
The introduction of Anaesthetic Mortality Committees in New South Wales (1960) and Queensland (1974) was followed by the establishment of the Victorian Consultative Council on Anaesthetic Mortality and Morbidity (VCCAMM) in 1976 by the state government under section 13 of the Health Act 1958. From January 2010 it has operated pursuant to sections 33 to 43 of the Public Health and Well-Being Act (2008) .
The Council's initial terms of reference (since slightly amended) were:
• to enquire into the circumstances of deaths and illnesses occurring during or as a result of anaesthesia, • to maintain a register of such cases, • to publish information regarding contributory factors, • to report to the Minister for Health annually.
The fact that the VCCAMM is the only statesponsored Council that analyses anaesthesia-related morbidity in addition to mortality was due to the foresight of the inaugural chairman, the late Dr Kevin McCaul, who lobbied extensively to ensure that the study of morbidity was included.
Initially there was a limited response by Victorian anaesthetists who were concerned about confidentiality. We believe however, that over time, the anaesthesia community has developed increasing confidence in the security of the data collection and analysis procedures. In addition to the confidentiality clauses within the legislative provisions, VCCAMM imposes additional security in that only the chairman and the confidential project officer are privy to the identity of the patient, hospital and reporting practitioner. All identifiable information is removed from case reports before presentation to Council. This trust has been demonstrated through the provision of a consistent volume of direct reports to Council by practising anaesthetists. More recently, there has also been a process of referral to Council of cases from quality assurance co-ordinators of hospital-based departments of anaesthesia. There are now approximately equal numbers of cases submitted as either direct or quality assurance reports. VCCAMM therefore functions as a repository of voluntarily submitted adverse event reports from the Victorian anaesthesia community.
METHOD
There is a standard report form used for direct reports, with fields to include specific details including gender, age, American Society of Anesthesiologists physical status, procedure, elective/emergency, event, expected/unexpected, grade of anaesthetist, level of supervision and a free text section to encourage a personal account of the event, as well as a prompt for opinion as to cause. Additional information may be sought by the chairman prior to presentation of the case to Council. Quality assurance reports are sometimes submitted on a standard form but are mostly less structured and additional information is rarely attainable.
During the period from 1990 to 2005, a total of 2254 reports were reviewed and classified by Council, using its established classification system (Appendix 1).
There were a total of 1291 mortality reports, of which 187 (14.5%) were classified as anaesthesiarelated. From these data, it is clear that the majority of deaths reviewed by Council are not related to anaesthesia and are predominantly classifiable as either inevitable or surgical. Although, historically, there have been difficulties in obtaining accurate denominator data for the total number of anaesthetics administered, the estimated anaesthesia-related mortality in Victoria for this period has remained relatively stable at approximately 1 per 50,000 to 60,000 anaesthetics administered [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] .
It is recognised that review of mortality is essential to monitor the safety of the practice of anaesthesia. However, given that mortality from anaesthesia is low, we are of the view that there is considerable additional benefit to be obtained by analysis of morbidity reports. This is reflected by the high proportion of cases of morbidity classified as anaesthesia-related, 736 of 963 (78.5%). It also gratifying that Victorian anaesthetists are very willing to submit reports of adverse events for peer review and quality assurance purposes. There are of course inherent limitations in this approach. Voluntary reporting will always underestimate the frequency of events, and it is impossible to measure true prevalence in the absence of accurate denominator data. In addition, interpretation of the impact of any morbid adverse event is somewhat subjective. We believe however, that the process of case deliberation by Council, including classification, subcategorisation and allocation of keywords, does provide a relatively robust analysis.
Council membership is currently comprised of the chairman, a specialist anaesthetist nominated by the Australian and New Zealand College of Anaesthetists (ANZCA), recommended by the Minister for Health and appointed by Cabinet, and sixteen specialist anaesthetists. Of these, three are nominated by ANZCA, three are nominated by the Australian Society of Anaesthetists, and ten are nominated by Victorian Teaching and Regional Hospitals, and appointed by the Minister. There are six additional members nominated by each of the Royal Australasian College of Surgeons, the Australasian College of Emergency Medicine, the Royal Australian College of General Practitioners, the Australian and New Zealand Intensive Care Society, the Victorian Institute of Forensic Medicine and the Department of Health, and these are also appointed by the Minister. Council meets monthly and reviews cases that have been prepared by the chairman and the confidential project officer.
We report here on the 736 morbid adverse events reported to VCCAMM between 1990 and 2005, using a combination of Council's classification system for subcategories (Appendix 1) and keywords (Appendix 2). It is also important to note that much of this data has been previously sequentially reported in the sixth, seventh, eighth and ninth reports of VCCAMM [1] [2] [3] [4] . In this paper however, we have attempted to identify the clinical issues that have emerged from morbidity review over a 15year period, rather than be confined to any triennium.
The use of keywords is a major component of our methodology in this report, in that the sub-headings for the types of complications (anaesthesia-related morbidity) is derived from collation of case clusters under such keywords in the VCCAMM case file database. There are no definitions for the keywords but they are allocated to each case only after due consideration by Council. It is recognised that, due to the voluntary nature of reporting, our analysis is likely to represent only a relatively small proportion of anaesthesia-related adverse events occurring in Victorian hospitals. Nevertheless, we consider that the information is sufficiently valid to draw some reasonable conclusions and to justify certain recommendations. We also suggest that the relevant clinical issues can be generalised, at least throughout Australia and New Zealand, and perhaps to other developed countries as well.
Analysis of mortality cases is not included in this report and can be accessed from the previously published sixth, seventh, eighth and ninth Council reports [1] [2] [3] [4] . Mortality data for the triennium 2003 to 2005 is included in the ANZCA publication, Safety of Anaesthesia: A review of anaesthesia-related mortality in Australia and New Zealand 2003 to 2005 5 and will also be included in the tenth report of Council (in preparation).
DEFINITION
We define anaesthesia-related morbidity as "any event related to an anaesthetic procedure that causes a life-threatening incident, temporary or permanent disability, or significant distress". Morbidity can be then be categorised as major or minor according to outcome. It is recognised that the term 'significant distress' is not defined and inevitably subjective. However, each adverse event reported to Council is evaluated collaboratively with regard to the degree of patient harm.
CATEGORIES
In order to provide clarity regarding the classification of morbidity reports reviewed by Council over this 15-year period, we have listed the cases under the following categories which also takes account of appropriate keywords: We recognise that such an allocation is somewhat arbitrary, but as information is to be increasingly shared, it is important to pursue agreement on some common approaches to these definitions. For instance, an epidural haematoma causing spinal cord damage is clearly a neurological complication which occurred, however, either indirectly or directly, as a result of a regional anaesthesia procedure. Similarly, hypotension might occur as a result of the combination of relaxant general anaesthesia and an epidural. Is this a cardiovascular complication or a procedure-related one? We have chosen to place such events under the category of the actual complication, hence neurological and cardiovascular for these two examples. However, although we have been able to list cases under one category, there are many reports, especially in the earlier years, in which the primary keyword might not have accurately captured the relevant subcategory. Wherever possible, we have attempted to group the case reports in clusters in order to identify the relevant clinical issues.
It is important to note therefore that, although some categories will list numbers of cases, it was not possible to provide a complete breakdown of all 736 cases of anaesthesia-related morbidity. When it is clinically relevant we have also included comments for some of the additional cases that we have classified as surgical morbidity.
CASE REVIEW
The following review covers 736 cases in which morbidity was reported and the headings show the number and percentage for the major categories described.
Airway morbidity (190 reports, 26%) Airway obstruction
The main causes of acute obstruction of the airway were glottic oedema (including that due to neck haematoma), retained foreign body and equipment-related causes. Several cases of oedema were attributed to difficult intubation, but an emerging cause is after prolonged surgery in either prone or head-down posture.
There were several reports of obstruction following extubation which demonstrated the failure to recognise the hazards of extubation. This is particularly relevant in cases in which there had been a difficult intubation and there may have been multiple episodes of airway instrumentation. Although it is a surgical complication, vigilance for postoperative airway obstruction due to neck haematoma is essential for anaesthetists and, most importantly, for recovery and postoperative ward nursing staff.
Unexplained postoperative glottic oedema was also occasionally attributed to antibiotic allergy. Communication and system failures were the causes of several cases of retained throat packs, which is especially hazardous after patients have been transferred to areas (ward, intensive care unit) where they are no longer under the direct care of the anaesthetist. Throat swabs or packs must be included in the surgical count to help prevent this absolutely life-threatening system error. Cases of equipment-related airway obstruction included kinking, mucus plugging and over-inflation and/or herniation of endotracheal tube cuffs, and occlusion of airway filters during prolonged surgery.
Of note there were 25 cases of acute respiratory obstruction during emergence that resulted in negative pressure pulmonary oedema. Risk factors are young, muscular patients who struggle against the endotracheal tube or other artificial airway during emergence. Prevention requires attention to detail to reduce the risk of extubation-related laryngospam and consideration of the adequacy of analgesia.
Difficult intubation
Unexpected difficult intubation was a particular feature in earlier cases involving obstetric patients, although recent reports continue to reveal poor preoperative assessment and planning. One of the major issues in the pursuit of safer anaesthesia practice is absolute vigilance in preoperative assessment of the airway, so that the frequency of unexpected difficulties in airway management can be minimised. It should be noted that difficult intubation was not a sub-category of morbidity in itself but is included only if associated with an adverse event. In some instances there was associated pulmonary aspiration. There was one case of unrecognised oesophageal intubation leading to hypoxia, with resultant permanent neurological damage in a patient who had been placed in the prone position. Delayed recognition of oesophageal intubation in another case was due to change of anaesthetist. Although now a rare occurrence in the operating theatre due to the routine use of end-tidal carbon dioxide monitoring, it is significant that several of these cases occurred in recovery or intensive care areas where either the monitoring was not available or the operator did not accept the monitor readings. Such indecision was also evident in some case of hypoxia where pulse oximeters were wrongly considered to be malfunctioning as an explanation for low readings.
Anaesthetists are nowadays very aware of the need to combine clinical assessment of the airway and ventilation with oximetry and capnography monitoring, but there is still a major concern that other clinicians undertaking airway management outside the operating room environment are not so concerned with the need for provision of, and familiarity with, these essential monitors. It is mandatory that capnography is deployed in any situation in which endotracheal intubation is performed.
Respiratory morbidity (123 reports, 17%) Aspiration (57)
There were 57 cases classified as anaesthesiarelated aspiration and six cases in which surgical factors were the cause. In 17 reported cases, aspiration occurred in the setting of a laryngeal mask airway, and in 10 of these it was deemed that the choice of laryngeal mask airway was inappropriate. Contributing clinical factors were obesity, a history of smoking and perianal surgery with inadequate depth of anaesthesia. Cases were identified in which aspiration occurred during laryngeal mask airway use and the anaesthetist's access to the airway was limited (e.g. during radiological procedures).
The sequelae of aspiration varied but lobular atelectasis was very common and there were 16 cases of pulmonary consolidation. Aspiration resulted in unplanned admission to a high dependency unit on 45 occasions and unplanned overnight admission to the general ward in 12 day cases. Risk factors for aspiration regardless of the choice of airway were gastro-oesophageal reflux, obesity, emergency surgery and smoking history. Interestingly, in emergency orthopaedic surgery, duration of fasting (beyond the recommended four to six hours) appeared irrelevant as some patients aspirated in this setting even with prolonged fasting. This would appear to reinforce the view that gastric emptying is impaired after trauma.
Important clinical issues in the setting of aspiration were: • unstable induction with light anaesthesia, coughing and/or obstruction, • intubation difficulty, • posture (especially lithotomy and/or head-down), • inadequate preoperative assessment of reflux, • inappropriate choice of airway management, • poor airway protection in high risk upper G/I endoscopy, • extubation of 'at risk' patients in the supine position, • drug error when the relaxant was omitted before attempted intubation.
Hyperinflation (6) Hyperinflation with resultant hypotension, most likely due to increased right ventricular afterload, occurred in six cases. This potentially lifethreatening complication resulted from small airways obstruction secondary to bronchospasm either related to asthma, anaphylaxis or poor airway management. Anaesthesia management should include attention to detail in the suppression of airway reflexes in those patients at increased risk (asthma, smoking history).
There was one case of barotrauma resulting from hyperinflation secondary to a ventilator setting error. If hyperinflation is suspected, it is essential to exclude equipment malfunction at the earliest opportunity. It is also very important to recognise the need to provide sufficient expiratory time to reduce right ventricular afterload while the primary cause of the obstruction is being treated. Cardiovascular stability and safe oxygenation are the priorities and temporary hypercapnia should be tolerated in the initial phase.
Acute pulmonary oedema (37)
There were 37 reports involving acute pulmonary oedema, 25 of which were in the setting of acute upper airway obstruction (negative pressure pulmonary oedema). Importantly, in most of these cases the oedema is transient and can often be managed non-invasively with continuous positive airway pressure. The remaining 12 case reports were hydrostatic pulmonary oedema involving fluid overload (10) and/or cardiac disease (2) .
Respiratory depression (23)
There were many reports of respiratory depression associated with postoperative pain management, highlighting the considerable organisational problems in this area. There were at least five reports of life-threatening respiratory depression due to the delayed effects of intrathecal or epidural opioids, one of which involved the simultaneous use of systemically administered drugs.
Patient-controlled analgesia was implicated in 10 reports involving excessive sedation and respiratory depression, one of which resulted in severe hypoxic brain damage. Long-acting oral opioids prescribed for patients having day surgery were implicated in delayed respiratory depression after discharge in four reports. Combination therapy for postoperative analgesia is popular and commonly effective, but there were a number of cases of respiratory depression in elderly, vulnerable patients when administered multiple potent agents including opioids, ketamine and tramadol.
Failure to account for important comorbidities, particularly renal failure, was another factor in respiratory depression associated with postoperative analgesia. It is extremely likely that there are very large numbers of incidents and adverse events in this domain that are not reported.
Cardiovascular morbidity (58 reports, 8%) Hypotension (31)
One of the most important causes of hypotension is anaphylaxis, but we have chosen to discuss such events under the category of drug-related complications. Significant hypotension was often associated with regional anaesthesia (21), particularly when combined with general anaesthesia (12). On some occasions it was attributed to drug effects including excessive doses of intravenous induction agents and also noteworthy was the exaggerated hypotensive response to vasodilators and beta blockers given by anaesthetists to control intraoperative hypertension.
Another important issue was the failure to recognise and manage major blood loss, particularly in young patients in whom the significance of tachycardia was underestimated. In such circumstances, the subsequent hypotensive response to hypovolaemia may occur late and be very serious.
There were several reports of low arterial blood pressure secondary to postural changes at the end of surgery, particularly resumption of the supine posture post lithotomy. This is important in that it often occurs during transfer to the recovery room. Adverse outcomes were most often related to a greater than 30% reduction from the baseline (or estimated normal) blood pressure. A number of such events occurred postoperatively either in recovery or the ward, highlighting the importance of postoperative observation and monitoring. The main adverse outcomes were myocardial ischaemia, myocardial infarction and stroke. Many of these patients had documented peripheral vascular disease which is known to carry an increased risk for such complications.
Myocardial ischaemia and/or infarction (17)
There were 17 case reports of either myocardial ischaemia and/or infarction. Many of these were attributable to hypotension. The issue of the adequacy of myocardial perfusion and its dependence upon the maintenance of a safe level of arterial blood pressure and control of heart rate remain key factors in prevention of perioperative myocardial ischaemia and/or infarction. Identification of the risk factors, provision of adequate monitoring and vigilance about the need for early and appropriate intervention are paramount. However, it is also important to recognise that some patients will suffer this complication despite all appropriate measures being deployed in the perioperative period.
Cardiac failure (10)
There were a number of reports in which major cardiovascular morbidity was attributed to the failure to take account of pre-existing cardiac disease during preoperative assessment. Thorough evaluation of serious conditions such as severe aortic stenosis, left ventricular dysfunction and pulmonary hypertension is essential in order to co-ordinate appropriate perioperative care.
Embolism
Council reports were received involving various subcategories of embolism. The majority were actually classified as surgical complications, the most frequent being cement and/or fat embolism associated with orthopaedic surgery. The important practical issue is the need to identify the significance of any cardiovascular instability and or impairment of gas exchange during hip, pelvic or femoral manipulation (with or without cement) as being a potential embolic event. In such situations, attention should be paid to supporting cardiorespiratory status intraoperatively and maintaining appropriately escalated and monitored care postoperatively.
Interestingly, there were also three reports of gas embolism from oxygen which had resulted from the use of hydrogen peroxide (H 2 O) for wound irrigation. Occasional cases of venous thromboembolic events were reported and there were also some cases of air embolism, mostly related to the surgical procedure. However, one very important cause of iatrogenic air embolism which was anaesthesia-related involved the inappropriate use of non-vacuum infusion bags with the Level 1™ (Level 1 Technologies Inc. Rockland, USA) rapid infusion device, at a time when the device was not fitted with an integrated air detector and automatic shut-off mechanism. As a result of this report, the Council alerted the regulatory authority, Therapeutic Goods Administration, and subsequently all Level 1 rapid infusion systems included the mandatory provision of air detection and automatic occlusion devices.
Drug-related morbidity (163 reports, 22%) Adverse drug reactions (98)
There were 98 reports of adverse reactions to anaesthesia drugs, of which neuromuscular blocking agents were the most common agents implicated. These comprised suxamethonium (20), rocuronium (16), atracurium (7) and cisatracurium (1). The second most common agent triggering such events was the gelatin-based colloid Haemaccel R (now AST Pharmaceuticals) for which there was a total of 18 reports. In these cases, a diagnosis of adverse reaction was accepted if other causes of acute hypotension were reasonably excluded and/or there were associated cutaneous manifestations. It is noteworthy that most of these reports with Haemaccel R occurred before the year 2000, after which there was a change to the formulation. This demonstrates the importance of adverse event reporting in improving clinical safety. It is recognised that more recently developed colloid solutions using either gelatin or starch have the potential for adverse reactions but these are less frequent than with previous products. The other agents commonly implicated were antibiotics administered by the anaesthetist at the time of induction.
Vigilance is essential at the time of administration of all these classes of drugs so that there is no delay in crisis management that may exacerbate the outcome. There is certainly evidence from some case reports that delayed response to profound hypotension during anaphylaxis increases the risk of major morbidity and mortality. It is recognised that all anaesthetists must have a low threshold for suspecting anaphylaxis when any patient develops unexpected hypotension and/or other clinical signs including bronchoconstriction and cutaneous vasodilatation. Crisis management must include a call for assistance, early administration of appropriate doses of adrenaline and other resuscitation measures. It is important in all cases of suspected allergic reactions to also collect blood samples for mast cell tryptase and to organise patient follow-up to an allergy testing service.
Drug error (65)
There were 65 case reports of drug error and the problem appears to be increasing. This could be explained by increased reporting rather than an absolute increase in frequency. However, the risk is obviously greater when more drugs are used and modern anaesthesia techniques involve a wide range of drugs, both anaesthetic and ancillary.
Most reports of potentially life-threatening errors involved the inadvertent administration of vasoactive agents. The common practice of drawing up so-called contingency drugs such as metaraminol, although deemed by some to be a safe practice by avoiding a delayed response to hypotension, carries an increased risk of harm through drug error. Planned management including use of labels and separate sites for storage of such drugs is recommended.
There were also a number of cases in which a neuromuscular blocking drug was given instead of a sedative. The obvious sequela of this syringe swap is awareness but there have also been near misses for fatal outcomes in the circumstances of inadequate patient surveillance and monitoring and/or delayed recognition of the problem. Protocols for continuous observation of sedated patients and separation of anaesthesia room and theatre drug trays should be deployed.
We recommend that all locations for provision of anaesthesia should have available self-adhesive preprinted labels that are colour-coded by class of drug according to the current national standard (Australian/New Zealand standard AS/NZ:1996). Equipment-related drug errors coincided with the deployment of total intravenous anaesthesia (TIVA) techniques and prevention resides in meticulous and routine checking of intravenous infusion devices and access sites.
There were some reports involving preparation and/or administration errors for drugs (including infusions and patient-controlled analgesia pumps) in ward areas for postoperative care including pain management. Prescription errors, overdose and failure to account for comorbidities were common aspects of opioid drug errors in postoperative patients. It should also be noted that very recently a new ANZCA policy document, PS51 (2009), Guidelines for the Safe Administration of Injectable Drugs in Anaesthesia, has been published 6 .
Neurological morbidity (50 reports, 7%) Spinal cord injury (17)
Spinal cord injury due to compression from an epidural haematoma and/or abscess occurring as a result of central neural blockade (epidural/ spinal procedures) is one of the most catastrophic complications related to anaesthesia. During this 15-year period, there were a total of 17 cases, two of which occurred in 1998, and 15 between 2000 and 2005. Thirteen of these involved an epidural haematoma and four were epidural abscesses.
Despite the fact that it will always be difficult to estimate the denominator for the number of occasions on which central neural blockade was performed during these years, this represents an unacceptable level of risk. Review of these reported cases indicated that in 10 cases there was an association with administration of anti-coagulants.
Organisational failure leading to delay in establishing the diagnosis was identified in 12 cases. It is absolutely imperative that all patients in whom epidural analgesia is deployed are continuously monitored in order to detect any neurological sequelae. Any new onset of back pain, motor block and/or changes to sensory level should immediately prompt urgent exclusion of an epidural haematoma by imaging with magnetic resonance imaging or computed tomography scan myelogram as well as neurosurgical referral.
Council also reviewed two cases in which spinal cord injury was due to direct damage during insertion of spinal needles at an inappropriate level by inexperienced operators. This again indicates organisational failure in the lack of supervision. There were seven cases of spinal cord infarction, not necessarily associated with central neural blockade. Contributory factors identified included hypotension, hypovolaemia, posture and type of surgery (e.g. aortic). There was a single report of cauda equina syndrome and two cases of meningitis attributed to spinal procedures.
Cerebrovascular event (stroke)
There were several cases in which a stroke occurred in the setting of significant hypotension associated with combined central neural blockade and general anaesthesia. Several such patients also had co-existing cerebrovascular and/or peripheral vascular disease. Preservation of systemic arterial blood pressure is the cornerstone of management to minimise the risk of this complication.
Nerve damage or injury
There were a number of cases of neuropraxia, commonly associated with posture and prolonged anaesthesia and surgery. It is notoriously difficult to ascertain the major cause in such cases but care with the patient's posture and provision of appropriate padding around peripheral nerves is important to reduce risk.
Seizure
There were several cases in which seizure was related to inadvertent intravascular injection and/ or systemic absorption of local anaesthetic agents associated with regional anaesthesia. This was most common with brachial plexus blocks. The risk can be reduced by attention to appropriate dose and frequent aspiration during injection.
Awareness (19)
Over the period of this review, there has been an interesting trend in case reporting for awareness. In the late 1990s awareness was frequently associated with equipment failure of vaporisers. This was prior to the availability of end-tidal agent monitoring. From 2000 to 2002, there was a cluster of reports coinciding with the promulgation of TIVA. Awareness associated with TIVA occasionally is due to the use of inappropriately low doses but more commonly it is due to failure of the drug delivery system involving multiple infusion lines with inappropriate equipment and/or lack of vigilance. Such cases obviously overlap into the section on drug errors, reinforcing our reporting constraints for numerical accuracy. It is likely that the more widespread deployment of bispectral index monitoring, especially in TIVA with relaxants, is genuinely reducing the frequency of awareness. In the later years of this review, awareness was less frequently reported and occasionally resulted from drug administration errors involving relaxants.
Metabolic morbidity Malignant hyperthermia (6)
There were six reports of malignant hyperthermia and the successful outcome in all cases reflected the early recognition, team management and adherence to protocols available in all anaesthetising locations. The recommended dose schedule for dantrolene is now 2.5 mg/kg. Information on malignant hyperthermia can be found on the website 7 .
Procedure-related morbidity
We decided to include this category in order to best account for complications directly related to various procedures including regional blocks, insertion of intravascular lines and other monitoring procedures such as transoesophageal echocardiography. We have already described the major morbidity associated with central neural blockade and brachial plexus blocks under neurological and cardiovascular categories.
There were 20 reports involving injuries associated with invasive cardiovascular monitoring. Almost certainly, there were many more such events that were not reported to Council. Injuries included inadvertent carotid puncture during internal jugular venous cannulation, migration of vascular guidewires into the circulatory system after femoral venous and/or arterial cannulation and pneumothorax resulting from attempted internal jugular and/or subclavian vein cannulation. Complications of pulmonary artery catheterisation can be catastrophic if pulmonary artery rupture occurs. It is recognised that the increased use of invasive arterial and central venous blood pressure monitoring is probably reducing anaesthesia and surgical-related morbidity. However, it is important that such techniques are deployed appropriately and with great attention to detail, in order to minimise the risk of complications. Increasing use of ultrasound to confirm vascular anatomy and/or directly guide vascular access devices is likely to improve the safety of invasive monitoring techniques.
Toward the latter part of this review period, there were two cases of oesophageal injury associated with the intraoperative use of transoesophageal echocardiography in cardiac surgery. Subsequently, the Council initiated a survey of this complication using the Australian Cardiac Surgery Database to identify potential cases which were then sought and referred to Council for review 8 .
Equipment-related morbidity
There was a diverse range of equipmentrelated morbidity, many of which have been described in other categories. These include airway obstruction related to endotracheal tube occlusion, cuff herniation and blockage of airway filters. Some of the cases of respiratory depression were attributed to delivery errors for analgesia infusion devices such as patient-controlled analgesia pumps and human factor errors related to lack of familiarity with such equipment. One specific and unresolved risk is the potential for regional anaesthesia infusion devices to be erroneously connected to intravenous lines. Although current practice involves colour-coding and infusion labelling, there is a need for mandatory standards of incompatibility of connection devices between the different types of infusion systems. Such provisions are not yet in place. Several cases of awareness were due to malfunction of anaesthesia delivery equipment including vaporisers and infusion pumps. We have already described the cases of iatrogenic air embolism associated with the inappropriate use of the earlier types of rapid infusion systems before the inclusion of air detection and line occlusion components. Reassuringly, current devices used for rapid fluid infusion are now all fitted with the relevant alarms and occlusion systems.
Organisational issues
In addition to the specific clinical issues involved in the above eight categories of morbidity, we have identified cases in which organisational failure contributed to the adverse outcome. Examples include inadequate supervision, poor communication and failure of interdisciplinary planning. We identified many organisational problems in the provision of postoperative pain management (44 of 69 cases). This remains a high risk area and catastrophic sequelae occurred in 12 of the 17 cases of spinal cord injury, in which there was either lack of knowledge and/or failure to escalate care to exclude or confirm the diagnosis of epidural haematoma, with the resultant delays contributing to poor outcomes. Other examples of organisational problems were identified in preoperative care, failure to include dental swabs and/or throat packs in surgical counts and some aspects of crisis management.
DISCUSSION
We acknowledge the limitations of this case review. It has proven difficult to allocate accurately all the reported cases of morbidity into the eight designated categories. The major reason is that the VCCAMM classification system and list of subcategories has been modified over the period between 1990 and 2005. The level of detail in individual case reports varies greatly because the VCCAMM report form invites anaesthetists to provide their own free-text account of the event. The list of keywords used by Council has also evolved in order to capture all relevant clinical issues. More recently, we have sought to specify a primary keyword for each case, in order to provide the most suitable categorisation.
In this report we have specified eight separate categories of anaesthesia-related morbidity: airway, respiratory, cardiovascular, drug-related, neurological, metabolic, procedure-related and equipmentrelated. It should be noted that these categories do not directly align with the six sub-categories that are included in the VCCAMM classification system, namely, preoperative, anaesthesia technique, anaesthesia drugs, anaesthesia management, postoperative and organisational. We regret this potential confusion, but defend our approach as we believe it is important for all agencies involved in the reporting of anaesthesia-related adverse events to pursue consensus on some broadly agreed definitions. The eight 'newly defined' categories are of course not mutually exclusive with the six existing VCCAMM sub-categories. The former list helps to specify the clinical system for the morbidity outcome, whereas the latter provides some information about the temporal and procedural setting in which the complication occurred. In this review, we have highlighted separately the contribution of organisational failure, which continues to emerge as an important contributory factor in anaesthesiarelated adverse events.
Recently there has been much activity in the pursuit of anaesthesia incident and adverse event reporting. A group from several Melbourne metropolitan teaching hospitals (Austin, Alfred, Royal Melbourne) and one Victorian regional teaching hospital (Geelong) has developed the Victorian Anaesthesia Safety Project, a pilot web-based adverse event reporting system. The Project's list of categories of morbidity is identical to the eight categories used in this review, and is a deliberate attempt to seek agreement on such definitions among the entire anaesthesia community. Over the last four years, there has been significant engagement by the ANZCA, Australian Society of Anaesthetists and the New Zealand Society of Anaesthetists in the area of incident reporting. The Australian and New Zealand Tripartite Anaesthesia Data Committee has been formed specifically to develop an anaesthesia-related system for reporting incidents and adverse events. It will include a range of modalities for data capture as well as sophisticated data integration systems to facilitate dissemination of knowledge obtained from incident reporting. We hold the view that all such groups should be encouraged to collaborate and seek agreement on definitions and categorisation of adverse events.
Finally, and notably, there is now widespread interest and investment by governments and healthcare agencies world-wide in the development and deployment of generic incident reporting systems. The application of incident reporting as a fundamental platform for clinical risk management is becoming a mainstream healthcare activity. While applauding such developments we remain strong advocates for the retention and enhancement of speciality-based adverse event reporting systems so that vital clinical information relevant to the craft group is retained. It is of concern that many health-care agencies seek to develop only generic reporting systems and the risk with these is that there is dilution of important clinical detail. Indeed it could reasonably be asserted that the discipline of anaesthesia has the longest and strongest track record in this field and therefore should continue to lead the way. Where it is reasonably certain that death or morbidity was caused by the anaesthesia or other factors under the control of the anaesthetist.
Category 2
Where there is some doubt whether death or morbidity was entirely attributable to the anaesthesia or other factors under the control of the anaesthetist.
Category 3
Where it is reasonably certain that death or morbidity was caused by both medical/surgical and anaesthesia factors.
Explanatory notes
• The intention of the classification is not to apportion blame in individual cases but to establish the contribution of the anaesthesia factors to the death or morbidity. • The above classification is applied regardless of the patient's condition before the procedure. However if it is considered that the medical condition makes a substantial contribution to the anaesthesia-related death or morbidity subcategory H should also be applied. • If no factor under the control of the anaesthetists is identified which could or should have been done better subcategory G should also be applied.
Death or morbidity in which anaesthesia played no part Category 4 Surgical death or morbidity where the administration of the anaesthesia is not contributory and surgical or other factors are implicated.
Category 5
Inevitable death or morbidity, which would have occurred irrespective of anaesthesia or surgical procedures.
Category 6
Fortuitous death or morbidity which could not reasonably be expected to have been foreseen by those looking after the patient, was not related to the indication for surgery and was not due to factors under the control of anaesthetist or surgeon.
Unassessable death/morbidity

Category 7
Those that cannot be assessed despite considerable data but where the information is conflicting or key data is missing.
Category 8
Cases, which cannot be assessed because of inadequate data.
Category 9
A critical incident where a problem is identified but no morbidity occurs.
causaL or coNtributory factors iN category a death or Morbidity Subcategories A. Preoperative (i) Assessment This may involve failure to take an adequate history or perform an adequate examination or to undertake appropriate investigation or consultation or make adequate assessment of the volume status of the patient in an emergency. Where this is also a surgical responsibility the case may be classified in Category 3 above.
(ii) Management This may involve failure to administer appropriate therapy or resuscitation. Urgency and the responsibility of the surgeon may also modify this classification.
B. Anaesthesia technique (i) Choice or application
There is inappropriate choice of technique in circumstances where it is contraindicated or by the incorrect application of a technique, which was correctly chosen.
(ii) Airway maintenance including pulmonary aspiration
There is inappropriate choice of artificial airway or failure to maintain or provide adequate protection of the airway or to recognise misplacement or occlusion of an artificial airway.
APPENDIx 1
Glossary of terms
